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_____________ 
 
O P I N I O N 
______________ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal requires us to decide whether the public 
has a right of access under the First Amendment to 
Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program.  Chancellor 
Strine and the judges of the Delaware Chancery Court 
(“Appellants”), who oversee the arbitrations, appeal a 
judgment on the pleadings entered in favor of the Delaware 
Coalition for Open Government (the “Coalition”).  The 
District Court found that Delaware’s proceedings were 
essentially civil trials that must be open to the public.  
Appellants dispute the similarities and argue that the First 
Amendment does not mandate a right of public access to 
Delaware’s proceedings.   
 
I. 
 
In early 2009, in an effort to “preserve Delaware’s pre-
eminence in offering cost-effective options for resolving 
disputes, particularly those involving commercial, corporate, 
and technology matters,” Delaware amended its code to grant 
the Court of Chancery “the power to arbitrate business 
disputes.”  H.B. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009).  As a 
result, the Court of Chancery created an arbitration process as 
an alternative to trial for certain kinds of disputes.  As 
currently implemented, the proceeding is governed both by 
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statute and by the Rules of the Delaware Court of Chancery.  
See 10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349 (2009); Del. Ch. R. 96-
98. 
 
Delaware’s government-sponsored arbitrations are not 
open to all Delaware citizens.  To qualify for arbitration, at 
least one party must be a “business entity formed or 
organized” under Delaware law, tit. 10 § 347(a)(3), and 
neither party can be a “consumer,” id. § 347(a)(4).  The 
statute is limited to monetary disputes that involve an 
amount-in-controversy of at least one million dollars.  Id. § 
347(a)(5).   
 
Once qualified parties have consented “by agreement 
or by stipulation” to avail themselves of the proceeding, they 
can petition the Register in Chancery to start arbitration.  Id. § 
347(a)(1); Del. Ch. R. 97(a).  The fee for filing is $12,000, 
and the arbitration costs $6,000 per day after the first day.  
Standing Order of Del. Ch. (Jan. 4, 2010).  After receiving a 
petition the Chancellor selects a Chancery Court judge to hear 
the arbitration.  See Del. Ch. R. 97(b); tit. 10, § 347(a).
1
  The 
arbitration begins approximately ninety days after the petition 
is filed, and, as the parties agreed in oral argument, is 
conducted in a Delaware courthouse during normal business 
hours.  See Del. Chr. R. 97(e).  Regular Court of Chancery 
Rules 26-37, governing depositions and discovery, apply to 
the proceeding, but the rules can be modified by consensual 
agreement of the parties.  See id. at 96(c); id. at 26-37.   
                                              
1
 Although the statute governing Delaware’s procedure allows 
for the Chancellor to appoint non-Chancery Court judges as 
arbitrators, see tit. 10, § 347(a), the Coalition only challenges 
arbitration by a member of the court.   
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The Chancery Court judge presiding over the 
proceeding “[m]ay grant any remedy or relief that [s/he] 
deems just and equitable and within the scope of any 
applicable agreement of the parties.”  Id. at 98(f)(1).  Once a 
decision is reached, a final judgment or decree is 
automatically entered.  Id. at 98(f)(3).  Both parties have a 
right to appeal the resulting “order of the Court of Chancery” 
to the Delaware Supreme Court, but that court reviews the 
arbitration using the deferential standard outlined in the 
Federal Arbitration Act.  Tit. 10, § 349(c).  Arbitrations can 
therefore only be vacated in relatively rare circumstances, 
such as when a party can prove that the “award was procured 
by corruption, fraud, or undue means” or that the “arbitrator[] 
w[as] guilty of misconduct.”  9 U.S.C. § 10; see also 
Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs., Inc., 409 
F.3d 574, 578 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 
Both the statute and rules governing Delaware’s 
proceedings bar public access.  Arbitration petitions are 
“considered confidential” and are not included “as part of the 
public docketing system.”  Tit. 10, § 349(b); Del. Ch. R. 
97(4).  Attendance at the proceeding is limited to “parties and 
their representatives,” and all “materials and 
communications” produced during the arbitration are 
protected from disclosure in judicial or administrative 
proceedings.  Del. Ch. R. 98(b).   
 
If one of the parties appeals to the Supreme Court of 
Delaware for enforcement, stay, or vacatur, the record of the 
proceedings must be filed “with the Supreme Court in 
accordance with its Rules.”  Id. at 97(a)(4).  “The petition and 
any supporting documents are considered confidential and not 
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of public record until such time, if any, as the proceedings are 
the subject of an appeal.”  Id.  The Delaware Supreme Court 
has yet to adopt rules that would govern the confidentiality of 
appeals from Delaware’s arbitration program, and there is no 
record of a public appeal from an arbitration award.     
 
In the District Court, the Coalition moved for 
judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the confidentiality of 
Delaware’s government-sponsored arbitration proceedings 
violated the First Amendment.  The District Court granted the 
Coalition’s motion.  The judges of the Delaware Chancery 
Court appeal.   
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and we have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de novo review over the 
District Court’s grant of a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.  DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 259 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
 
“The First Amendment, in conjunction with the 
Fourteenth, prohibits governments from ‘abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . . ’”  Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).  This protection of speech 
includes a right of public access to trials, a right first 
elucidated by the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers.  
In that case the Court found that a Virginia trial court had 
violated the First Amendment by closing a criminal trial to 
the public.  See id. at 580.  Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for 
the plurality emphasized the important role public access 
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plays in the administration of justice and concluded that  
“[t]he explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and publish 
concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much 
meaning if access to observe the trial could . . . be foreclosed 
arbitrarily.”  Id.  at 576-77.    
 
The Court has since found that the public also has a 
right of access to voir dire of jurors in criminal trials, see 
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984) 
(“Press I”), and to certain preliminary criminal hearings.  See 
El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149-50 
(1993) (per curiam) (preliminary criminal hearings as 
conducted in Puerto Rico); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior 
Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (“Press II”) (preliminary 
criminal hearings as conducted in California).  
    
We have found a right of public access to civil trials, 
as has every other federal court of appeals to consider the 
issue.  See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d 
Cir. 1984); see also F.T.C. v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 
F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1987);  Westmoreland v. Columbia 
Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Rushford v. 
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 
1988); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 
F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 
732 F.2d 1302, 1309 (7th Cir. 1984).  In addition to finding a 
right of public access to civil trials, we have also found a First 
Amendment right of the public to attend meetings of 
Pennsylvania city planning commissions and post-trial juror 
examinations.  See Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of W. 
Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 180-81 (3d Cir. 1999) (planning 
commissions); United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 840 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (post-trial juror examinations).  We have declined, 
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however, to extend the right to the proceedings of judicial 
disciplinary boards, the records of state environmental 
agencies, deportation hearings, or the voting process.  See 
First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 
F.2d 467, 477 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (judicial disciplinary 
board);  Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 
1175-76 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (records of state 
environmental agencies); N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2002) (deportation 
hearings); PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 112 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (voting process). 
 
The Experience and Logic Test 
 
A proceeding qualifies for the First Amendment right 
of public access when “there has been a tradition of 
accessibility” to that kind of proceeding, and when “access 
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the 
particular process in question.”  Press II, 478 U.S. at 10, 8.  
The examination of the history and functioning of a 
proceeding has come to be known as the “experience and 
logic” test.  See, e.g., Simone, 14 F.3d at 838.  In order to 
qualify for public access, both experience and logic must 
counsel in favor of opening the proceeding to the public.  See 
N. Jersey Media Grp., 308 F.3d at 213-14.  Once a 
presumption of public access is established it may only be 
overridden by a compelling government interest.  Press II, 
478 U.S. at 9. 
 
The District Court did not apply the experience and 
logic test.  Instead, it concluded that because Delaware’s 
government-sponsored arbitration was “sufficiently like a 
trial,” and because a right of public access applies to civil 
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trials, a right of public access must also apply to Delaware 
arbitrations.  See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. 
Supp. 2d 493, 500 (2012) (quoting El Vocero, 508 U.S. at 
149).  We find the District Court’s reliance on El Vocero 
misplaced and its decision to bypass the experience and logic 
test inappropriate.  In El Vocero the Supreme Court held in a 
per curiam opinion that the First Amendment right of public 
access applies to preliminary criminal hearings in Puerto 
Rico.  The Supreme Court did not engage in an experience 
and logic analysis in that case, but that was because it had 
already conducted such an inquiry in Press I, a case 
concerning nearly identical preliminary hearings in 
California.  See El Vocero, 508 U.S. at 149 (citing Press I, 
478 U.S. at 12).   
 
Although Delaware’s arbitration proceeding shares a 
number of features with a civil trial, the two are not so 
identical as to fit within the narrow exception articulated by 
the Supreme Court in El Vocero.  We therefore must examine 
Delaware’s proceeding under the experience and logic test.   
 
A.  Experience 
 
Under the experience prong of the experience and 
logic test, we “consider whether ‘the place and process have 
historically been open to the press and general public,’ 
because such a ‘tradition of accessibility implies the favorable 
judgment of experience.’”  N. Jersey Media Grp., 308 F.3d at 
211 (quoting Press II, 478 U.S. at 8).  In order to satisfy the 
experience test, the tradition of openness must be strong; 
however, “a showing of openness at common law is not 
required.”  PG Publ’g Co., 705 F.3d at 108 (quoting N. Jersey 
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Media Grp., 308 F.3d at 213) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
The litigants in this case disagree over which history is 
relevant to Delaware’s proceedings.  The Appellants suggest 
that we only examine the history of arbitrations, whereas the 
Coalition suggests we only examine the history of civil trials.  
Neither suggestion is appropriate in isolation.  If we were to 
only analyze the history of arbitrations as the Appellants 
suggest, we would be accepting the state’s designation of its 
proceedings as arbitrations at face value.  Uncritical 
acceptance of state definitions of proceedings would allow 
governments to prevent the public from accessing a 
proceeding simply by renaming it.  A First Amendment right 
that mandated access to civil trials, but allowed closure of 
identical “sivel trials” would be meaningless.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court has held that “the First Amendment question 
cannot be resolved solely on the label we give the event, i.e., 
‘trial’ or otherwise.”  Press II, 478 U.S. at 7.  The Coalition’s 
suggestion—that we rely solely on the history of civil trials—
is also flawed.   Defining Delaware’s proceeding as a civil 
trial at the outset would beg the question at issue here, and 
elide the differences between Delaware’s arbitration 
proceeding and other civil proceedings.   
 
There is no need to engage in so narrow a historical 
inquiry as the parties suggest. In determining the bounds of 
our historical inquiry, we look “not to the practice of the 
specific public institution involved, but rather to whether the 
particular type of government proceeding [has] historically 
been open in our free society.” PG Publ’g Co., 705 F.3d at 
108 (quoting Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1175) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in PG Publ’g Co.).  In 
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prior public access cases we have defined the type of 
proceeding broadly, and have often found “wide-ranging” 
historical inquiries helpful to our analysis of the First 
Amendment right of public access.  Id.  Thus in North Jersey 
Media Group, a case involving deportation hearings, we 
considered the entire history of access to “political branch 
proceedings.”  N. Jersey Media Grp., 308 F.3d at 209.  We 
exercised a similarly broad approach in PG Publishing 
Company, a case involving a challenge to a state statute 
restricting access to polling places in which we analyzed “not 
just the act of voting, but also the act of entering the polling 
place and signing in to vote.”  See PG Publ’g Co., 705 F.3d at 
109.   
Following this broad historical approach, we find that 
an exploration of both civil trials and arbitrations is 
appropriate here.  Exploring both histories avoids begging the 
question and allows us to fully consider the “judgment of 
experience.”  Press II, 478 U.S. at 11 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
1.  Civil Trials and the Courthouse 
 
As we explained in Publicker, there is a long history of 
access to civil trials.  See Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1068-70.  
The English history of access dates back to the Statute of 
Marlborough passed in 1267, which required that “all Causes 
. . . to be heard, ordered, and determined before the Judges of 
the King’s Courts [were to be heard] openly in the King’s 
Courts.”  Id. at 1068 (citing 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 103 (6th ed. 1681)) (emphasis in 
Publicker).  This tradition of openness continued in English 
Courts for centuries, ensuring that evidence was delivered 
“‘in the open Court and in the Presence of the Parties, their 
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Attorneys, Council, and all By-standers, and before the Judge 
and Jury . . . .’”  Id. (quoting MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF 
THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 163 (Charles M. Gray ed., 
U. Chicago Press 1971) (1713)).  Thus, “‘one of the most 
conspicuous features of English justice, that all judicial trials 
are held in open court, to which the public have free access, . . 
. appears to have been the rule in England from time 
immemorial.’”  Id. at 1069 (quoting EDWARD JENKS, THE 
BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73-74 (6th ed. 1967)).   
 
This tradition of access to trials and the courthouse 
was adopted by the American colonies and preserved after the 
American Revolution.  See id.  Courthouses served a central 
place in colonial life, encouraging “the active participation of 
community members” in shaping the “local practice of 
justice.”  Norman W. Spaulding, The Enclosure of Justice: 
Courthouse Architecture, Due Process, and the Dead 
Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 318-19 
(2012).  As courthouses grew increasingly elaborate in the 
late-eighteenth century, they continued to encourage public 
viewing, albeit in more formal surroundings.  See id. at 329-
32.  The courtroom also maintained its important public role: 
“[w]ith juries, spectators from the community, and press all 
present,” the courtroom “became a public state—a familiar, 
indeed immediately recognizable enclosure, in which the 
process of rights definition was made public . . . .”  Id. at 332.  
 
Today, civil trials and the court filings associated with 
them are generally open to the public.  Id; see, e.g., Del. Ch. 
R. 5.1(g)(1).  The courthouse, courtroom, and trial remain 
essential to the way the public conceives of and interacts with 
the judicial system.  See David Ray Papke, The Impact of 
Popular Culture on American Perceptions of the Courts, 82 
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Ind. L.J. 1225, 1233-34 (2007); see also Spaulding, 24 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. at 342.   
 
2.  Arbitrations 
 
Arbitrations also have a long history.  Written records 
of proceedings resembling arbitrations have been found in 
England as early as the twelfth century.  See 1 MARTIN 
DOMKE ET AL., DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 2:5 
(3d ed. 2011); 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES 
UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 4.2.1 (1999).  
Early arbitrations involved community participation, and 
evidence suggests that they took place in public venues.  See 
Edward Powell, Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration in 
Fifteenth-Century England, 2 LAW & HIST. REV. 21, 29, 33-
34 (1984); see generally LETTERS AND PAPERS OF JOHN 
SHILLINGFORD, MAYOR OF EXETER 1447-50 at 8 (Stuart A. 
Moore ed., 1871) (detailing arbitration proceeding overseen 
by chancellor and judges).  The use of arbitrations to resolve 
private disputes, however, was limited by English precedent, 
which prevented the enforcement of binding agreements to 
arbitrate.  See MACNEIL § 4.2.2.   
 
In the American colonies, arbitrations provided a way 
for colonists who harbored “suspicion of law and lawyers” to 
resolve disputes in their communities in a “less public and 
less adversarial” way.  JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE 
WITHOUT LAW?: RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LAWYERS 
4 (1983); Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal 
Law: Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 443, 454 (1984).   By the eighteenth century, 
however, arbitrations adopted increasingly formal procedures, 
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and at least some appear to have taken place in public.  See 
Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law at 468.  
 
As the American economy grew, disputes over 
business transactions led to the further development of 
arbitration proceedings.  These proceedings were occasionally 
supervised by a member of the judiciary “not acting in his 
official capacity.”  Id. at 475.  The popularity of commercial 
arbitration, however, was limited by precedent that made 
agreements to arbitrate essentially unenforceable.  See 
MACNEIL § 4.3.2; see also Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding 
Against Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a 
European Transplant and the Rise of a Distinctively 
American Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. 423, 445-46 (2009).  It was not 
until the passage of New York’s Arbitration Act of 1920 and 
the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, that arbitration 
agreements began to be treated by the courts like ordinary 
contracts.  DOMKE § 2:8; see also MACNEIL § 4.1.2.  These 
arbitration acts allowed private arbitration to take on the 
important role it now serves in resolving commercial 
disputes.  See MACNEIL §§ 5.3, 5.4.   
 
Modern arbitration law has led to the development of 
an industry devoted to offering arbitration services.  Groups 
such as the American Arbitration Association and JAMS, Inc. 
facilitate arbitration by appointing arbitrators, organizing 
hearings, and setting arbitration standards.  See Stephen 
Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in 
Evolution: An Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343, 362-68 (1995).  These arbitrations, 
unlike some of their antecedents, are distinctly private.  
Parties engaged in arbitration must pay both for the 
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arbitrations and for the space in which the arbitrations occur, 
and they usually choose to close their arbitrations to the 
public.  See Michael Collins, Privacy and Confidentiality in 
Arbitration Proceedings, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 121, 122 (1995).  
But see 3 MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 
32.6.1 (1999) (noting that parties can elect to allow access to 
proceedings). 
 
Although modern arbitration is dominated by private 
actors, a number of jurisdictions offer alternative dispute 
resolution procedures as a supplement to civil litigation.  See 
generally Yishai Boyarin, Court-Connected ADR—A Time of 
Crisis, A Time of Change, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 377 (2012).  
These procedures are sometimes called arbitrations, but 
unlike private arbitrations, they are usually non-binding, and 
can sometimes be initiated without the parties’ consent.  See 
Amy J. Schmitz, Nonconsensual + Nonbinding = 
Nonsensical? Reconsidering Court-Connected Arbitration 
Programs, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 587, 588-89, 
618 (2009).     
 
The history of arbitration thus reveals a mixed record 
of openness.  Although proceedings labeled arbitrations have 
sometimes been accessible to the public, they have often been 
closed, especially in the twentieth century.  This closure, 
however, can be explained by the private nature of most 
arbitrations.  Confidentiality is a natural outgrowth of the 
status of arbitrations as private alternatives to government-
sponsored proceedings.  Indeed, we would be surprised to 
find that private arbitrations—taking place before private 
arbitrators in private venues—had historically been accessible 
to the public. 
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Taking the private nature of many arbitrations into 
account, the history of civil trials and arbitrations 
demonstrates a strong tradition of openness for proceedings 
like Delaware’s government-sponsored arbitrations.  
Proceedings in front of judges in courthouses have been 
presumptively open to the public for centuries.  History 
teaches us not that all arbitrations must be closed, but that 
arbitrations with non-state action in private venues tend to be 
closed to the public.
2
  Although Delaware’s government-
sponsored arbitrations share characteristics such as 
informality, flexibility, and limited review with private 
arbitrations, they differ fundamentally from other arbitrations 
because they are conducted before active judges in a 
courthouse, because they result in a binding order of the 
Chancery Court, and because they allow only a limited right 
of appeal.
 
 
 
When we properly account for the type of proceeding 
that Delaware has instituted—a binding arbitration before a 
judge that takes place in a courtroom—the history of 
openness is comparable to the history that this court described 
in Publicker and the Supreme Court found in Richmond 
                                              
2
 Understood in this way, the closure of private arbitrations is 
only of questionable relevance.  Meetings by private 
organizations, for example, are usually closed to the public, 
yet we did not consider this history of closure when we found 
a First Amendment right of public access to city planning 
commissions.  See Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of W. 
Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1999).  Nor did we consider 
the history of access to votes undertaken by private 
organizations, when we examined the history of the voting 
process. See PG Publ’g Co., 705 F.3d at 110.   
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Newspapers.  Thus, unlike the “recent-and rebuttable-
regulatory (sic) presumption” of openness in deportation 
hearings we examined in North Jersey Media Group, 308 
F.3d at 213, or the “long-standing trend away from openness” 
in the electoral process we found in PG Publishing Co., 705 
F.3d at 110, the right of access to government-sponsored 
arbitrations is deeply rooted in the way the judiciary functions 
in a democratic society.  Our experience inquiry therefore 
counsels in favor of granting public access to Delaware’s 
proceeding because both the “place and process” of 
Delaware’s proceeding “have historically been open to the 
press and general public.”  Press II, 478 U.S. at 8.   
 
B.  Logic 
 
Under the logic prong of the experience and logic test 
we examine whether “access plays a significant positive role 
in the functioning of the particular process in question.”  Id.  
We consider both the positive role that access plays, and also 
“the extent to which openness impairs the public good.”  N. 
Jersey Media Grp., 308 F.3d at 202.   
 
We have recognized that public access to judicial 
 proceedings provides many benefits, including 
[1] promotion of informed discussion of 
governmental affairs by providing the public 
with the more complete understanding of the 
[proceeding]; [2] promotion of the public 
perception of fairness which can be achieved 
only by permitting full public view of the 
proceedings; [3] providing a significant 
community therapeutic value as an outlet for 
community concern, hostility and emotion; [4] 
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serving as a check on corrupt practices by 
exposing the [proceeding] to public scrutiny; [5] 
enhancement of the performance of all 
involved; and [6] discouragement of [fraud].   
 
PG Publ’g Co., 705 F.3d at 110-11 (quoting Simone, 14 F.3d 
at 839).  All of these benefits would accrue with the opening 
of Delaware’s proceeding.  Allowing public access to state-
sponsored arbitrations would give stockholders and the public 
a better understanding of how Delaware resolves major 
business disputes.  Opening the proceedings would also allay 
the public’s concerns about a process only accessible to 
litigants in business disputes who are able to afford the 
expense of arbitration.  In addition, public access would 
expose litigants, lawyers, and the Chancery Court judge alike 
to scrutiny from peers and the press.  Finally, public access 
would discourage perjury and ensure that companies could 
not misrepresent their activities to competitors and the public. 
 
The benefits of openness weigh strongly in favor of 
granting access to Delaware’s arbitration proceedings.  In 
comparison, the drawbacks of openness that Appellants cite 
are relatively slight.  First, Appellants contend that 
confidentiality is necessary to protect “patented information, 
trade secrets, and other closely held information.”  
Appellants’ Br. at 60.  This information, however, is already 
protected under Delaware Chancery Court Rule 5.1, which 
provides for the confidential filing of documents, including 
“trade secrets; sensitive proprietary information; [and] 
sensitive financial, business, or personnel information” when 
“the public interest in access to Court proceedings is 
outweighed by the harm that public disclosure of sensitive, 
non-public information would cause.”  Del. Ch. R. 5.1(b)(2).  
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These tailored protections are compatible with the First 
Amendment right of public access.  See Seattle Times Co. v. 
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33-36 (1984).   
 
Second, Delaware argues that confidentiality is 
necessary to prevent the “‘loss of prestige and goodwill’” that 
disputants would suffer in open proceedings.  Appellants’ Br. 
at 60 (quoting J. Noble Braden, Sound Rules and 
Administration in Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 189, 195 
(1934)).  Although the loss of prestige and goodwill may be 
unpleasant for the parties involved, it would not hinder the 
functioning of the proceeding, nor impair the public good.  As 
we have previously held, the exposure of parties to public 
scrutiny is one of the central benefits of public access.  See, 
e.g., PG Publ’g Co., 705 F.3d at 110-11. 
 
The Appellants’ third argument is that privacy 
encourages a “less hostile, more conciliatory approach.”  See 
Appellants’ Br. at 61 (citing ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., 
PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 
601 (3d ed. 2002)).  This may sometimes be true, but even 
private binding arbitrations can be contentious.  See Raymond 
G. Bender, Jr., Arbitration—An Ideal Way to Resolve High-
Tech Industry Disputes, 65 DISP. RESOL. J. 44, 49 (2010) 
(“[A]dvocates seeking to achieve the best outcomes for their 
clients have interjected litigation-like techniques into 
arbitration—contentious advocacy, uncontrolled discovery, 
aggressive motion practice, and other adversarial techniques 
aimed at achieving a ‘leg-up’ in the contest.”).  Moreover, 
informality, not privacy, appears to be the primary cause of 
the relative collegiality of arbitrations.  See ALAN SCOTT RAU 
ET AL, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 601 (1989) 
(citing “relative informality” of arbitration as reason for 
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reduced contentiousness); Christopher Baum, The Benefits of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest 
Development Disputes, 84 SAINT JOHN’S L. REV. 907, 925 
(2010) (“Arbitration is also less contentious than litigation 
because the formal rules of evidence do not apply, unless the 
parties agree otherwise.”).  We therefore do not find that a 
possible reduction in conciliation caused by public access 
should weigh heavily in our analysis.   
 
Finally, Appellants argue that opening the proceeding 
would effectively end Delaware’s arbitration program.  This 
argument assumes that confidentiality is the sole advantage of 
Delaware’s proceeding over regular Chancery Court 
proceedings.  But if that were true—if Delaware’s arbitration 
were just a secret civil trial—it would clearly  contravene the 
First Amendment right of access.  On the contrary: as the 
Appellants point out in the rest of their brief, there are other 
differences between Delaware’s government-sponsored 
arbitration and regular Chancery Court proceedings.  
Arbitrations are entered into with the parties’ consent, the 
parties have procedural flexibility, and the arbitrator’s award 
is subject to more limited review.  Thus, disputants might still 
opt for arbitration if they would like access to Chancery Court 
judges in a proceeding that can be faster and more flexible 
than regular Chancery Court trials.
3
 
                                              
3
 Even if granting public access to Delaware’s arbitrations 
were to limit their appeal, parties would still have two 
effective alternatives: private arbitration or public 
proceedings before the Chancery Court.  Thus, Appellants’ 
contention that allowing public access to Delaware’s state-
sponsored arbitration proceedings would lead to a mass 
exodus of corporations is overstated. 
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I agree with Judge Roth on the virtues of arbitration.  I 
cannot help but question why the Delaware scheme limits 
those virtues to litigants whose disputes involve an amount in 
controversy of at least a million dollars, and neither of whom 
is a consumer.  One wonders why the numerous advantages 
set forth in Judge Roth’s dissenting opinion (which 
apparently motivated the Delaware legislature) should not 
also be available to businesspersons with less than a million 
dollars in dispute.  I see no explanation in Judge Roth’s 
dissent for the limitation to rich businesspersons. 
 
In her dissent, Judge Roth states that she believes that I 
do not appreciate the difference between adjudication and 
arbitration, i.e., “that a judge in a judicial proceeding derives 
her authority from the coercive power of the state, while a 
judge serving as an arbitrator derives her authority from the 
consent of the parties.”    Indeed I do. 
 
Delaware’s proceedings are conducted by Chancery 
Court judges, in Chancery Court during ordinary court hours, 
and yield judgments that are enforceable in the same way as 
judgments resulting from ordinary Chancery Court 
proceedings.  Delaware’s proceedings derive a great deal of 
legitimacy and authority from the state.  They would be far 
less attractive without their association with the state.  
Therefore, the interests of the state and the public in openness 
must be given weight, not just the interests of rich 
businesspersons in confidentiality. 
 
Like history, logic weighs in favor of granting access 
to Delaware’s government-sponsored arbitration proceedings.  
The benefits of access are significant.  It would ensure 
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accountability and allow the public to maintain faith in the 
Delaware judicial system.  A possible decrease in the appeal 
of the proceeding and a reduction in its conciliatory potential 
are comparatively less weighty, and they fall far short of the 
“profound” security concerns we found compelling in North 
Jersey Media Group.  See 308 F.3d at 220.   
 
III. 
 
 Because there has been a tradition of accessibility to 
proceedings like Delaware’s government-sponsored 
arbitration, and because access plays an important role in 
such proceedings, we find that there is a First Amendment 
right of access to Delaware’s government-sponsored 
arbitrations.  We will therefore affirm the order of the District 
Court.   
 1 
Delaware Coalition for Open Government v. Strine,  No. 12-
3859 
FUENTES, J., concurring: 
Today we affirm the District Court’s ruling, which 
concluded that “the right of access applies to the Delaware 
proceeding created by section 349 of the Delaware Code.”  
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 504 
(D. Del. 2012).  Specifically, the District Court held that “the 
portions of [section 349] and [of] Chancery Court Rules 96, 
97, and 98, which make the proceeding confidential, violate 
that right.”  Id.  I agree.  I write separately because, given that 
not all provisions of § 349 of the Delaware Code or the 
Chancery Court Rules relating to Judge-run arbitration 
proceedings are unconstitutional, I think it is necessary to be 
more specific than the District Court’s order in pointing out 
those that are problematic and those that are not.  
 
I begin with § 349(b), which provides for the 
confidentiality in arbitration proceedings for business 
disputes.  This section states that: 
Arbitration proceedings shall be considered 
confidential and not of public record until such 
time, if any, as the proceedings are the subject 
of an appeal. In the case of an appeal, the record 
shall be filed by the parties with the Supreme 
Court in accordance with its rules, and to the 
extent applicable, the rules of the Court of 
Chancery. 
 
Del. Code. Ann., tit. 10, § 349(b). 
 2 
I agree with Judge Sloviter that this provision violates 
the First Amendment right of public access and cannot stand.  
However, I see nothing wrong with the other provisions of 
this statute.  I do not believe that § 349(a), granting the 
Chancery Court the power to arbitrate business disputes, or § 
349(c), providing for the filing of “applications to vacate, 
stay, or enforce an [arbitral] order” with the Delaware 
Supreme Court, violate the public right of access when § 
349(b) is removed from the statutory scheme. 
 
Similarly, not all provision of the Court of Chancery 
Court Rules implementing § 349 arbitrations raise 
constitutional concerns.  Chancery Court Rule 97(a)(4) 
provides: 
“The Register in Chancery will not include the 
petition [for arbitration] as part of the public 
docketing system.  The petition and any 
supporting documents are considered 
confidential and not part of public record until 
such time, if any, as the proceedings are the 
subject of an appeal.  In the case of an appeal, 
the record shall be filed by the parties with the 
Supreme Court in accordance with its Rules, 
and to the extent applicable, the Rules of this 
Court.” 
 
Chancery Court Rule 98(b) likewise provides that: 
“Arbitration hearings are private proceedings 
such that only parties and their representatives 
may attend, unless all parties agree otherwise.  
An Arbitrator may not be compelled to testify in 
 3 
any judicial or administrative proceeding 
concerning any matter relating to service as an 
Arbitrator.  All memoranda and work product 
contained in the case files of an Arbitrator are 
confidential.  Any communication made in or in 
connection with the arbitration that relates to 
the controversy being arbitrated, whether made 
to the Arbitrator or a party, or to any person if 
made at an arbitration hearing, is confidential. 
Such confidential materials and 
communications are not subject to disclosure in 
any judicial or administrative proceeding with 
the following exceptions: (1) where all parties 
to the arbitration agree in writing to waive the 
confidentiality, or (2) where the confidential 
materials and communications consist of 
statements, memoranda, materials, and other 
tangible evidence otherwise subject to 
discovery, which were not prepared specifically 
for use in the arbitration hearing. 
 
Again, I agree with Judge Sloviter that these 
provisions violate the First Amendment, but I do not find any 
problem with the remainder of the Chancery Court Rules 
implementing the § 349 arbitrations.  Chancery Court Rule 
96, containing certain definitions, is in my view constitutional 
in its entirety.  Similarly, the remaining portions of Rules 97 
and 98, which provide for the scope of arbitration, the proper 
procedures for an arbitration, and the logistics of hearings and 
dispute resolution, pass constitutional muster when Rules 
97(a)(4) and 98(b) are excised from the law. 
 
 4 
“The unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not 
necessarily defeat or affect the validity of its remaining 
provisions.”  Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 
286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).  It is well-settled that we must 
“refrain from invalidating more of a statute than is 
necessary.”  Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984).  
Even when construing state laws “[w]e prefer . . . to enjoin 
only the unconstitutional applications of [a] statute while 
leaving other applications in force, or to sever its problematic 
portions.”  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New 
England, 546 U.S. 320, 328-29 (2006) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 
The crux of today’s holding is that the proceedings set 
up by § 349 violate the First Amendment because they are 
conducted outside the public view, not because of any 
problem otherwise inherent in a Judge-run arbitration scheme.  
Thus, Appellants are enjoined only from conducting 
arbitrations pursuant to § 349(b) of Title 10 of the Delaware 
Code or Rules 97(a)(4) and 98(b) of the Delaware Chancery 
Court.  Nothing in today’s decision should be construed to 
prevent sitting Judges of the Court of Chancery from 
engaging in arbitrations without those confidentiality 
provisions.   
 
Appellants suggest that Judge-run arbitrations will not 
occur under § 349 unless they are conducted in private.  This 
may be so, but neither Appellants nor the Delaware 
Legislature have presented us with an alternative confidential 
arbitration scheme sufficiently devoid of the air of official 
State-run proceeding that infects the system now before us, 
sufficient to pass constitutional muster.  Nor have they 
otherwise suggested that we attempt to sever offending 
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portions of the statute to construct such an alternative.  Thus, 
we have no occasion to consider if different arbitration 
schemes pass constitutional muster, and we are left with no 
choice other than to sever the confidentiality provisions.  See 
generally Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) 
(explaining that a court may not sever a portion of a law 
unless it can conclude that “the statute created in its absence 
is legislation that [the Legislature] would . . . have enacted”). 
 
Appellants only severability argument is a very limited 
one, that invalidating the self-executing aspect of the arbitral 
awards, Del. Ch. R. 98(f)(3), is enough to cure any 
constitutional infirmity.  But as Appellants themselves 
describe it, the procedure contemplated in Rule 98(f)(3) is 
merely “a matter of convenience.”  Appellants’ Reply Br. at 
28.  It eliminates the need to file the arbitral award in court, a 
step that is only significant if a party refuses to abide by an 
arbitrator’s award, a rarely occurring contingency.  For 
essentially the reasons stated in Judge Sloviter’s opinion, the 
mere formality of filing that award in Court, which Rule 
98(f)(3) skirts, does not alone alter the First Amendment right 
of access calculus one way or another.     
 
But I reiterate that we do not express any view 
regarding the constitutionality of a law that may allow sitting 
Judges to conduct private arbitrations if the system set up by 
such a law varies in certain respects from the scheme before 
us today.  Indeed, it is likely that the Delaware Legislature 
has at its disposal several alternatives should it wish to 
continue to pursue a scheme of Judge-run arbitrations. 
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With this understanding of the scope of today’s 
decision, I join in Judge Sloviter’s opinion and concur in the 
judgment. 
1 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 The use of arbitration as a method of resolving 
business and commercial disputes has been increasing both 
here and abroad.  For example, the caseload of the American 
Arbitration Association’s International Center for Dispute 
Resolution grew by almost 330 per cent between 1994 and 
2004.
1
  The number of requests for arbitration in the London 
Court of International Arbitration grew by 300 per cent in the 
last decade.
2
 
 
 There are a number of factors that have caused this 
growth in arbitration.  One is the importance of resolving 
disputes expeditiously.  Businesses in this country and abroad 
need to get commercial conflicts resolved as quickly as 
possible so that commercial relations are not disrupted.  
Another factor in the growth of arbitration is the increase in 
commercial disputes between businesses located in different 
countries.  In particular, non-U.S. companies, with no 
familiarity – or with too much familiarity – with the 
American judicial system, may prefer arbitration with the 
rules set by the parties to lengthy and expensive court 
proceedings.  In addition, arbitration permits the proceedings 
                                              
1
 Loukas Mistelis, International Arbitration – Corporate 
Attitudes and Practices – 12 Perceptions Tested:  Myths, 
Data and Analysis Research Report, 15 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 
525, 527 (2004). 
 
2
 Compare London Court of International Arbitration’s 
Director General’s Report for 2001 with the Director 
General’s Reports for 2010 and 2011, available at 
http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/Casework_Report.aspx 
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to be kept confidential, protecting trade secrets and sensitive 
financial information.  The Supreme Court has summarized 
these advantages as follows: 
 
 The point of affording parties discretion 
in designing arbitration processes is to allow for 
efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the 
type of dispute.  It can be specified, for 
example, that the decisionmaker be a specialist 
in the relevant field, or that proceedings be kept 
confidential to protect trade secrets.  And the 
informality of arbitral proceedings is itself 
desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the 
speed of dispute resolution.. 
 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1749 
(2011).  
 
 The State of Delaware has become interested in 
sponsoring arbitration as a part of its efforts to preserve its 
position as the leading state for incorporations in the U.S.  
One of the reasons that Delaware has maintained this position 
is the Delaware Court of Chancery, where the judges are 
experienced in corporate and business law and readily 
available to resolve this type of dispute.  Nevertheless, 
judicial proceedings in the Court of Chancery are more 
formal, time consuming and expensive than arbitration 
proceedings.  For that reason, the Court of Chancery, as a 
formal adjudicator of disputes, may not be able to compete 
3 
 
with the new arbitration systems being set up in other states 
and countries.
3
   
 
 In order to prevent the diversion elsewhere of complex 
business and corporate cases, the Delaware Legislature in 
2009 enacted legislation to create an arbitration system.  The 
Legislature established the arbitral system in the Court of 
Chancery where the judges are the most experienced in 
corporate and business litigation.  The Legislature declared 
that the new system was “intended to preserve Delaware’s 
preeminence in offering cost-effective options for resolving 
disputes, particularly those involving commercial, corporate, 
                                              
3
 See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Task Force on N.Y. Law in Int’l 
Matters, Final Report 4 (June 25, 2011) (‘[J]urisdictions 
around the world, many with government support, are taking 
steps to increase their arbitration case load.  New arbitration 
laws were enacted in 2010 and 2011 in France, Ireland, Hong 
Kong, Scotland, Ghana and other nations to enhance their 
attractiveness as seats of arbitration.  . . .  In 2010, at least 
three jurisdictions established specialized courts to handle 
international arbitration matters – Australia, India and Ireland.  
Several other jurisdictions well-known for international 
arbitration, including France, the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, Sweden and China, have designated certain 
courts or judges to hear cases to challenge or enforce 
arbitration awards.  Among the cited reasons for this focus on 
arbitration is the governments’ recognition of the importance 
of arbitration to their economies and to their position in 
toady’s world of global commerce.”); id. at 38, available at 
http://www.nysba.org/workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=340
27. 
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and technology matters.”  H.B. 49, 145th Gen. Assem. (Del. 
2009).  
 
 This Delaware arbitration system is offered to business 
entities (at least one of which must have been formed or 
organized under Delaware law; no party can be a consumer) 
to resolve expensive and complex disputes (for disputes 
involving solely monetary damages, the amount in 
controversy must be at least $1,000,000) with the consent of 
the parties.  The arbitrators are judges of the Court of 
Chancery or others authorized under the Rules of the Court of 
Chancery.  The proceedings are confidential.  In my view, 
such a set-up creates a perfect model for commercial 
arbitration. 
 
 Judge Sloviter urges, however, that the Delaware 
system violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  
Maj. at 23.  In arriving at this conclusion, she does not rely 
solely on either the history of arbitration or the history of civil 
trials.  She looks “‘not to the practice of the specific public 
institution involved, but rather to whether the particular type 
of government proceeding [has] historically been open in our 
free society’.”  Maj. at 11 (quoting PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 
705 F.3d 91, 108 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Capital Cities 
Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1175 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(en banc)) (alterations in original).
4
  She classifies that 
                                              
4
 I believe that Judge Sloviter does not appreciate the 
difference between adjudication and arbitration, i.e., that a 
judge in a judicial proceeding derives her authority from the 
coercive power of the state while a judge serving as an 
arbitrator derives her authority from the consent of the 
parties. 
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“particular type of government proceeding,” which would 
occur in the Delaware arbitration system, as one that has 
traditionally been open to the public.  Maj. at 11.  In my view, 
her analysis begs the question.   
 
 On the other hand, Judge Fuentes, while concurring 
with Judge Sloviter, is less broad in his conclusion.  His 
concern is with the confidentiality of the proceedings.  He 
concludes that the confidentiality provisions of 10 Del. C. § 
349(b) violate the First Amendment right of public access and 
cannot stand.  He also concludes that the confidentiality 
provisions for docketing and holding hearings found in 
Chancery Court Rules 97(a)(4) and 98(b) violate the First 
Amendment.  However, Judge Fuentes finds most of the 
statute and rules to be acceptable.  He has no problem with a 
sitting judge arbitrating business disputes.  He has no problem 
with the self-executing aspect of the arbitral awards.  
 
 I do not agree with Judge Fuentes’s contention that the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s arbitration proceedings cannot 
be confidential.  Confidentiality is one of the primary reasons 
why litigants choose arbitration to resolve disputes – 
particularly commercial disputes, involving corporate 
earnings and business secrets.  See 1 Bette J. Roth et al., The 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Practice Guide 7:12 (2013).  
  
 In this dissent, I will focus on the issue of 
confidentiality because that is the only area in which Judge 
Fuentes and I differ.  I will not discuss the other issues raised 
by Judge Sloviter although I could, if necessary, respond to 
those also.  I will limit my discussion to the difference 
between Judge Fuentes’s views and my own.      
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An examination of confidentiality in arbitration should 
begin in colonial times.   The tradition of arbitration in 
England and the American colonies reveals a focus on 
privacy.  See Michael Collins, Privacy and Confidentiality in 
Arbitration Proceedings, 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. 121, 122 (1995) 
(“In English law . . . it has for centuries been recognized that 
arbitrations take place in private.”); Amy J. Schmitz, 
Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 545 U. Kan. 
L. Rev. 1211, 1223 (2006) (“The New York Chamber of 
Commerce . . . established an arbitral regime at the 
Chamber’s inception in 1765. . . . [and] relied on arbitration’s 
privacy and independence to foster efficient resolution of 
disputes among the American and British merchants during 
and after the American Revolutionary War.”).5  In the 
twentieth century, the modern arbitration bodies began to 
develop rules for arbitration proceedings that emphasize 
privacy and confidentiality.  See Richard C. Reuben, 
Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54 U. Kan. 
L. Rev. 1255, 1271-72 (2006).   
 
Today, the major national and international arbitral 
bodies continue to emphasize confidentiality.  Their rules 
provide that arbitration proceedings are not open to the public 
unless the parties agree they will be.  See, e.g., AAA & ABA, 
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, 
Canon VI(B) (2004); AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules R-
23 (2009); UNCITRAL, Arbitration Rules art. 21(3) (2010).  
                                              
5
 The majority asserts that some early arbitrations took place 
in public.  While this may be true, arbitrations even during 
this period were overwhelmingly private.  See, e.g., Michael 
Collins, Privacy and Confidentiality in Arbitration 
Proceedings, 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. 121, 122 (1995). 
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Thus, as a rule, arbitration has not “historically been open to 
the press and the general public.”  Press II, 478 U.S. at 8.6   
 
With this history of arbitration in mind, looking at 
experience and logic, see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court of Calif. for the Cnty. of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 8 
(1986), I conclude that, historically, arbitration has been 
private and confidential.  Logically, the resolution of complex 
business disputes, involving sensitive financial information, 
trade secrets, and technological developments, needs to be 
confidential so that the parties do not suffer the ill effects of 
this information being set out for the public – and especially 
competitors -- to misappropriate.  For these reasons, there is 
here no First Amendment right of public access. 
 
In conclusion, then, it appears to me to be very clear 
that, when the State of Delaware decided to create its 
arbitration system, it was looking at traditional arbitration, in 
a confidential setting, before arbitrators experienced in 
business and corporate litigation.  Delaware did not intend the 
arbitration system to supplant civil trials.  Delaware did not 
intend to preclude the public from attending proceedings that 
historically have been open to the public.  The new system 
was created to provide arbitration in Delaware to businesses 
that consented to arbitration – and that would go elsewhere if 
                                              
6
 Judge Sloviter states that the “closure of private arbitrations 
is only of questionable relevance.”  Maj. at 16 n.2.  I disagree.  
The development of private arbitration is key to 
understanding the functions of arbitration as a dispute 
resolution process and its tradition concerning public access 
and confidentiality.  
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Delaware did not offer arbitration before experienced 
arbitrators in a confidential setting.  
 
 For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.  I would 
reverse the judgment of the District Court and uphold the 
statute and rules which establish the Delaware arbitration 
system. 
  
